International Diversification and Conference Calls: Legal System and Ownership Structure by Chin, Chen-lung
American Accounting Association 2009 Annual Meeting, August 1-5, 2009 
 
International Diversification and Conference Calls: Legal System 
and Ownership Structure 
 
Chin, Chen-lung; Chen, Yu-Ju 
 
Abstract 
 
A firm's international diversification is one potentially important strategy 
to follow in pursuit of growth in merging markets as well as developed 
countries. This paper explores the impact of international diversification 
on the decision to hold conference calls. Next, we examine if the 
mitigating roles of agency problems and firm' choice of a higher 
proportion of common law countries in holding conference calls. The 
agency problems is proxied by the divergence between controlling 
owner's control and cash rights; the internationalization is measured by 
the ratio of foreign assets to total assets, foreign operational country 
scope, and by the number of foreign investees, respectively. Using a 
sample drawn from Taiwan, we find that greater corporate 
internationalization is associated with a higher likelihood of holding 
conference calls. We also find that firms can enhance the positive effects 
of internationalization on conference calls likelihood by reducing control 
divergence of controlling owners or investing in a higher proportion of 
common law countries where there is a better investor legal protection 
environment and higher information transparency. Finally, we find that in 
addition to stock pyramids and cross-ownership structures, managers of 
internationally diversified firms use stock collateral to leverage their 
control rights, which exacerbates agency problem and lead to a lower 
likelihood of holding conference calls. 
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